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the broader world economy as the cooperative or conflicted nature of this relationship will set 
the tone for progress on a number of multilateral issues, including reform of the international 
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 An Awkward Dance: China and the United States 
 
Eswar Prasad and Grace Gu 
 
The relationship between the U.S. and China has come to resemble an awkward pas de 
deux, with the two partners regularly stepping on each other’s toes. While the economic 
entanglements between the two countries have increased over the last decade, the number 
of flashpoints has increased as well.  
 
Why is an economic relationship that is clearly important to both countries proving so 
hard to manage? The very nature of the dependence between these two economies makes 
it ripe for conflict. China remains highly dependent on U.S. export markets and continues 
to look to U.S. Treasury bond markets to park a large portion of its rapidly rising stock of 
foreign exchange reserves. The U.S. receives a large volume of low-cost imports from 
China and also gets help from China in financing a significant part of its budget and 
current account deficits. 
 
China would like to tear itself away from the U.S. Treasury market but faces the prospect 
of a big capital loss on its large accumulated stock of holdings if U.S. Treasury bond 
prices were to rise or if the renminbi eventually appreciated in value against the U.S. 
dollar. The U.S. has become a lot less dependent on China’s financing of its deficits, 
particularly as the U.S. private saving rate has gone up and the current account deficit has 
fallen. Nevertheless, given the sheer scale of the U.S. deficit financing requirement—a 
budget deficit of about $1.4 trillion in 2009 and prospects of about $9 trillion of deficits 
over the next decade—sentiments in bond and currency markets are fragile. A precipitous 
action by China to shift out of U.S. dollar instruments (or even an announcement of such 
an intention) could act as a trigger that nervous market sentiments coalesce around, 
leading to a plunge in bond prices and the value of the U.S. dollar.  
 
The bargaining strengths of the two countries are finely balanced. But this sets up a 
dangerous game of chicken that could easily spin out of control if the desire to pander to 
domestic audiences trumps rational collective policymaking in one or both countries.  
 
This note provides a fuller picture of the tightening embrace between the two countries—
in terms of flows of goods and services, financial capital and people—and the 
implications. The China-U.S. relationship is important not just for the principals but also 
for the broader world economy as the cooperative or conflicted nature of this relationship 
will set the tone for progress on a number of multilateral issues, including reform of the 
international monetary system and tackling climate change.  
 
Trade in Goods and Services 
 
The trade relationship between China and the U.S. has intensified over the past two 
decades, although the financial crisis has set this back slightly (see Figure 1). In 1985, 
trade between the two countries was modest and balanced. Since China’s accession to the 
WTO in 2001, which gave it greater access to the U.S. export market, growth in China’s   2 
exports to the U.S. has skyrocketed, with China’s exports now about five times the 
quantity of its imports from the U.S.  
 
China’s exports to the U.S. are dominated by manufactured goods and by machinery and 
transportation equipment (see Figure 2). China’s imports from the U.S. are largely 
accounted for by machinery and transportation equipment and crude materials, inedible, 
mineral fuels, lubricants and related materials.  
 
Trade in services between the two economies has been more modest than goods trade but 
has been rising sharply, with the main categories dominated by those that involve 
movement of people (travel, transportation, education; see Figure 3). 
 
A central question is whether trade between the two economies has made them more 
important as mutual trading partners (see Figure 4). Interestingly, exports to the U.S. 
accounted for a relatively stable share of about 22 percent of China’s overall exports from 
1999 to 2006. In 2007-08, the share of China’s exports going to the U.S. declined to 
about 18 percent. By contrast, the share of U.S. exports accounted for by China has been 
much smaller, leveling off at about 4 percent in the last couple of years.  
 
These numbers probably understate the true importance of China’s dependence on the 
U.S. export market. In terms of sheer volume, U.S. imports still account for a significant 
share of world final consumption demand. Moreover, a great deal of intra-Asian trade is 
the result of expansion of cross-country supply chains. IMF analysis suggests that about 
one-third of the value added component of exports from Asia is still accounted for by the 
U.S. Thus, a slowdown in U.S. demand could lead to slower growth in other economies 
that export large quantities to the U.S. and thereby have indirect knock-on effects on 
Chinese export growth to those economies as well.  
 
As a source of U.S. imports, China’s share has increased steadily, climbing to 13 percent 
of total U.S. imports by 2008. China’s dependence on U.S. imports, by contrast, has 
fallen over time, with imports from the U.S. accounting for about 9 percent of China’s 
imports in 2007-08.  
 
A Matter of Balance 
 
Many of the thorny issues in the bilateral relationship between these two countries can be 
traced to the evolution of the rising bilateral trade deficit that the U.S. runs with China. In 
2008, the deficit of $268 billion with China amounted to over one-third of the overall U.S. 
trade deficit of $681 billion (see Figure 5).  
 
The U.S. current account deficit, which had hit $800 billion in 2006, declined slightly in 
2007-08 and the crisis-induced recession in the U.S. is expected to shrink the deficit to 
just under $400 billion in 2009. China’s current account surplus is expected to fall only 
slightly to about $372 billion in 2009. These developments in the trade and current 
accounts have kept the focus on China’s exchange rate regime.  
   3 
Chinese currency policy, which involves heavy intervention in the foreign exchange 
market to prevent the currency (the renminbi) from appreciating, has resulted in a rapid 
rise in foreign exchange reserves (see Figure 6). After a tiny net increase in the first 
quarter of 2009, reserve accumulation has again picked up sharply in pace, with an 
additional accumulation of $256 billion from March to August (about $51 billion a 
month). This has increased the stock of China’s reserves to $2.2 trillion.  
 
The balance of payments shows that a rising current account surplus, which has in turn 
been dominated by rising trade surpluses, accounts for a substantial fraction of the 
increase in reserve accumulation since 2005 (see Table 1). China’s international 
investment position has improved steadily, revealing a strong net asset position of $1.5 
trillion at the end of 2008 (see Table 2). In other words, the value of China’s foreign 
assets now far exceeds the value of its external liabilities. Foreign exchange reserves 
account for about two-thirds of China’s gross foreign assets.  
 
The exchange rate is a key relative price for international trade. China’s nominal 
exchange relative to the dollar was flat for a decade until July 2005, when there was a 
step appreciation of 2 percent of the renminbi relative to the U.S. dollar (see Figure 7). 
The renminbi has since then racked up a cumulative nominal appreciation of 21 percent 
relative to the dollar. However, over the past 12 months, the renminbi has remained 
tightly pegged to the dollar, riding up with the U.S. dollar as it strengthened due to the 
safe-haven effect during the global financial crisis and down with the U.S. dollar since 
March 2009, when that effect began to wear off. This has reversed some of the 
appreciation of the trade-weighted measure of China’s real effective exchange rate, which 
is now up about 20 percent relative to its level in July 2005.  
 
It is not easy to estimate the “equilibrium” value of the renminbi—the level it would 
settle at if China’s capital account was open and there was no government intervention in 
the foreign exchange market. The fact that the People’s Bank of China has consistently 
intervened in just one direction and by massive amounts—as indicated by its 
accumulation of foreign exchange reserves—suggests that the renminbi would appreciate 
significantly, conditional on capital outflows being relatively restricted, if China’s central 
bank stopped intervening in the foreign exchange market.  
 
Financial Dependence between China and the U.S.  
 
Despite the notion of U.S. firms investing heavily in China, official foreign direct 
investment (FDI) flows from the U.S. to China peaked at $5.4 billion in 2002 and have 
remained at a level around $3 billion a year since 2005 (see Figure 8). This low number 
could partially be due to American companies’ use of offshore financial centers to 
channel FDI flows to China in order to gain some tax benefits. Nevertheless, all available 
data indicate that most FDI flows to China are from other Asian countries that are 
integrating their supply chains with China. FDI from China to the U.S. remains very 
modest.  
   4 
The major financial link between the two countries remains Chinese purchases of dollar-
denominated financial assets. China does not make public the currency denomination or 
composition of its foreign exchange reserves. U.S. data from the government’s Treasury 
International Capital System (TIC) database are potentially misleading as they capture 
the location rather than identity of a purchaser of U.S. instruments. For instance, China’s 
purchases of Treasury bonds routed through a U.K. bank would be counted as a purchase 
by a U.K. resident or institution. Notwithstanding these caveats, the TIC data capture 
some interesting trends.  
 
About one-third of China’s holdings of foreign exchange reserves are in U.S. Treasury 
securities (see Table 3, Panel C). The real proportion is likely to be higher for the reasons 
noted above. It is intriguing that, even based on these data, the share of China’s reserve 
accumulation going into U.S. treasuries in 2008 was much higher than during the period 
2004-07. During 2009, there has been enormous whipsawing from net sales to net 
purchases of U.S. treasuries, along with sharp shifts from Treasury bills (short term) to 
Treasury bonds (medium to long term) and back, with no discernible consistent pattern 
(see Table 3A).  
 
Based on TIC and other U.S. data, it is possible to construct a profile of the owners of 
U.S. government debt held by the public, which stood at $7.4 trillion at the end of August 
2009 (plus an additional $7.2 trillion of government-sponsored agency debt, which 
represents a liability of the U.S. government as well). China’s share of total outstanding 
government debt held by the public has risen steadily over the years and now stands at 11 
percent, which is about one-quarter of all U.S. debt held by foreigners. China’s share of 
outstanding U.S. agency bonds was 6.4 percent in 2007 but fell below 6 percent in 2009.  
 
In short, even based on official data that probably understate the true picture, China has 
contributed to a considerable proportion of U.S. debt financing and there are no 
indications from official data that this pattern has shifted drastically in recent months.  
 
Movement of People 
 
Along with flows of capital and goods, the flow of persons between the two countries has 
also increased rapidly (see Figure 9). The number of students coming from China to the 
U.S. has doubled since 1996. Chinese students now account for about nearly 13 percent 
of all foreign students in the U.S. The number of U.S. Study Abroad students going to 
China has also increased sharply from the early 2000s but from a much lower base. The 
number of immigrants from China admitted into the U.S. has followed a similar trend 
while the number of tourists from China (measured in person-days) has tripled since 1996.  
 
Managing a Complicated Relationship 
 
China and the U.S. are slowly adjusting to two major realities—their increasing mutual 
economic dependence and the rising heft of China on the global economic stage. While 
there has been a convergence between these two economies in some dimensions, in 
others there remains a yawning gap in economic terms (see Figure 10). In dollar terms,   5 
China’s per capita income is about one-tenth that of the U.S.; total private consumption in 
China is about $1.5 trillion compared to $10 trillion in the U.S. But China has a much 
bigger labor force, higher saving rates and far less public debt than the U.S.  
 
China is slowly adjusting to its role as a major global economic power and still trying to 
find the right balance between asserting its authority and managing the responsibility that 
comes with being a major power. There are other economies that depend heavily on the 
U.S.—Canada and Mexico come to mind—but none of these has the heft of China or the 
desire and ability to become a world power in their own right. This creates a situation that 
is ripe for economic and geopolitical jockeying, with great potential for conflict even 
though both countries would stand to gain from a constructive relationship.  
 
High-level policy dialogues such as the Strategic and Economic Dialogue and visits by 
each country’s leaders to the other are essential for improving each side’s understanding 
of the complicated political and social dynamics that drive policymaking in each country. 
Such understanding is essential to manage this relationship which could easily be derailed 
by marginal trade disputes over cars, chickens, steel pipes and tires. The problem is that 
these disputes with minor direct ramifications could spin out of control if pandering to 
domestic constituencies locks each nation’s leaders into a cycle of confrontation that 
escalates disputes to a more damaging level.  
 
The two countries are locked in an ever-tightening embrace. Whether this embrace turns 
out to be a warm one or develops into a mutual choke-hold will have a big impact on the 
futures of these two economies and could also have ramifications for global financial and 








































































































































China's imports from U.S. China's exports to U.S.
Growth of China's imports to U.S. Growth of China's exports to U.S.
Source: CEIC, U.S. Census Bureau and authors' calculations. 
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Source: CEIC and authors' calculations. 
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Source: CEIC, World Economic Outlook Database, April 2009, IFS, and 
authors' calculations. 
Note: U.S. trade data include goods and services. Forecasts for 2009 are from 
the IMF.  





























































































































































Spot Exchange Rate: RMB to USD
































































































U.S. Real Effective Exchange Rate Index: Based on Consumer Price Index
China Real Effective Exchange
Source: CEIC, BIS, IFS, and authors' 
 Rate Index
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Source: CEIC, WEO, WTO and authors' calculations.  
Note: U.S. FDI 1996 actually is 1997 number instead of 1996, due to data availability. Labor force, 
normally, consists of everyone of working age (typically above a certain age, around 14 to 16) and below 
retirement (around 65) who is actively employed or seeking employment. Here, China uses economically 
active labor data. For net public debt, data are based on IMF forecasts; China uses gross public debt instead 
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Table 1.  The Balance of Payments 
(in billions of US dollars) 
  
 
            
 
     
 
                                
  1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005  2006  2007  2008 2009 
                                        
                
Gross international reserves  143.4  149.8  158.3 168.9 218.7 295.2 412.2 618.6 825.6 1072.6 1547.3 1966.2  . 
(in percent of GDP)  15.0  14.7  14.6  14.1 16.5 20.3 25.1 32.0 36.8 40.8 45.8 45.4  . 
                 
Change in international reserves  34.9  6.4  8.5 10.5 49.8 76.5  117.0  206.3  207.0 247.0 474.7 418.9  . 
                 
    A. Current account balance  37.0  31.5  21.1 20.5 17.4 35.4 45.9 68.7  160.8 249.9 371.8 426.1  371.5 
        (in percent of GDP)  3.9  3.1  1.9 1.7 1.3 2.4 2.8 3.6 7.2  9.5 11.0  9.8 7.8 
                 
          Merchandise trade balance  46.2 46.6 36.0 34.5 34.0 44.2 44.7 59.0  134.2 217.7 315.4 360.7  . 
         (in percent of GDP)  4.9  4.6 3.3 2.9 2.6 3.0 2.7 3.1  6.0 8.3 9.3 8.3  . 
                    
    B. Capital account balance 21.0  -6.3  5.2  2.0  34.8  32.3 52.7  110.7 63.0  10.0  73.5  19.0  . 
           FDI, net  41.7  41.1  37.0 37.5 37.4 46.8 47.2 53.1 67.8  60.3 121.4  94.3  . 
                  
    C. Errors and omissions, net  -22.3  -18.7  -17.8 -11.9  -4.9  7.8  18.4  27.0  -16.8 -12.9  16.4 -26.1  . 
                   
Memorandum Items:                  
                   
Non-FDI  capital  account  balance                 
  (including errors and omissions)  -42.9  -66.1  -49.6  -47.4 -7.4 -6.7 23.9 84.6  -21.6 -63.2 -31.5  -101.4  . 
                
Nominal  GDP  953 1019 1083 1198 1325 1454 1641 1932 2244  2626  3382  4327 4758 
                                        
                   
Sources : CEIC, IFS and authors’ calculations.   
 
           
                  
Notes: The non-FDI capital account balance is the capital account balance minus net FDI plus net errors and omissions. 2009 numbers are from IMF  
estimates.  
   
 
              
  
Table 2.  International Investment Position 
(in billions of U.S. dollars) 
              
  2004 2005 2006  2007  2008
           
Net Position  293 423 662 1022 1519
         
A. Assets  930 1223 1627 2288 2920
          
1. FDI  53 65 91 116 169
2. Portfolio  92 117 265 285 252
     Equity  0 0 2 20 21
     Debt  92 117 264 265 231
3. Other investment  167 216 252 427 533
4. Reserve assets  619 826 1081 1547 1966
     Foreign exchange reserves 610 819 1066 1528 1946
        
B. Liabilities  637 800 965 1266 1401
          
1. FDI  369 472 614 704 876
2. Portfolio  57 77 121 147 161
     Equity  43 64 107 129 144
     Debt  13 13 14 18 17
3. Other investment  212 252 300 362 364
          
              
Source: State Administration of Foreign Exchange website     
        
  
Table 3. China's Purchases and Holdings of U.S. Financial Instruments 
(in billions of U.S. dollars) 
                       
   Panel A: Net purchases of securities in the U.S.  Panel B: Annual flows  Panel C: End-of-year stocks 






































1990 0.3  -0.2  0.3  0.0  0.0  0.2 0.3 5.5  0.06  .  11.1  . 
1991  0.6 0.0 0.1  0.0  0.0  0.4  0.6 10.6  0.06  . 21.7  . 
1992  5.3 0.3 3.4  0.5  0.7  0.4  5.3 -2.3  -2.32  . 19.4 . 
1993 0.7  -0.1  0.5  0.6  0.1  -0.3  0.7  1.8 0.39  .  21.2  . 
1994 16.1  3.7  12.2  0.5  0.1  -0.4 16.1 30.4  0.53  . 51.6  . 
1995 14.8  13.7  0.7  0.9  0.0  -0.4 14.8 22.0  0.67  . 73.6  . 
1996 14.6  -2.8  14.5  2.8  0.3  0.0 14.6 31.4  0.47  .  105.0 . 
1997  2.1  -7.4  8.2 1.7  0.1 -0.4  2.1  34.9  0.06  . 139.9  . 
1998 1.1  -4.1  2.6  0.9  0.0  1.7 1.1 5.1  0.21  .  145.0  . 
1999 14.7  -2.7  8.2  8.3  0.7  0.1 14.7  9.7  1.51  .  154.7 . 
2000 17.6  0.4  -4.0  18.8  0.7  1.6 17.6 10.9  1.61 60.3  165.6  0.36 
2001 55.0  -0.9  19.1  26.0  6.7  4.1 55.0 46.6  1.18 78.6  212.2  0.37 
2002 63.1  0.2  24.1  29.3  6.1  3.5  63.1  74.2  0.85 118.4 286.4  0.41 
2003 68.4  0.3  30.1  29.4  4.5  4.0  68.4 116.9  0.58 157.7 403.3  0.39 
2004  67.5 17.2 18.9  16.4  12.1 3.0  67.5 206.6  0.33 193.8 609.9  0.32 
2005 84.3  -4.9  37.4  23.0  25.6  3.3  84.3 209.0  0.40 310.0 818.9  0.38 
2006 114.5  1.9  37.7  35.6  31.7  7.6  114.5 247.4  0.46 349.6  1066.3  0.33 
2007 139.7  16.6  -8.0  73.7  45.7  11.7 139.7 461.9  0.30 477.6  1528.2  0.31 
2008 276.8  133.8  84.7  17.4  28.9  12.0  276.8 417.8  0.66 724.7  1946.0  0.37 
                       
Notes: The data in Panel A are taken from the tables entitled "U.S. Banking Liabilities to Foreigners" and "U.S. Transactions with 
Foreigners in Long-Term Securities" on the U.S. Treasury website at http://www.treas.gov/tic/. Treasury bills have an original maturity of 
less than one year. Treasury bonds include marketable treasury and federal bank bonds and notes with an original maturity of one year or 
longer. Government agency bonds include bonds of U.S. government corporations and federally-sponsored agencies. The stock data on 
holdings of U.S. Treasury securities (Panel C) are taken from "Major Foreign Holders of U.S. Treasury Securities" on the U.S. Treasury 
website. Note that the flow data on net purchases of Treasury bills and Treasury bonds in Panel A cannot be fully reconciled with the 
estimated stock of Treasury securities in Panel C (e.g. for 2002 and 2003), because the stock data are re-benchmarked whenever a new 
survey is conducted. 
                       
Sources: Treasury International Capital System, CEIC, and authors' calculations.           
                       
  
Table 3A. China's Purchases and Holdings of U.S. Financial Instruments 
(in billions of U.S. dollars) 
                     
   Panel A: Net purchases of securities in the U.S.  Panel B: Monthly flows  Panel C: End-of-month stocks 






































Jan-09 8.5  11.6  0.6  -4.2  0.2  0.4  8.5  -32.5  -0.262  739.6 1913.5  0.387 
Feb-09 4.0  5.6  -1.0  -0.6  -0.5  0.4  4.0  -1.4  -2.841  744.2 1912.1  0.389 
Mar-09 24.5  8.8  14.8  -0.4  0.5  0.7  24.5  41.6 0.589  767.9  1953.7 0.393 
Apr-09 -6.5  -14.8  10.3  -0.9  -1.8  0.7  -6.5  55.2  -0.117  763.5  2008.9 0.380 
May-09 36.6  34.0  4.0  -1.8  -0.2  0.5  36.6  80.6 0.454  801.5  2089.5 0.384 
Jun-09  -25.6  -51.8 26.6  -0.6  -0.3 0.5 -51.8 42.1  -1.229  776.4  2131.6  0.364 
Jul-09 22.3  8.8  15.3  -2.2  -0.4  0.7  8.8  43 0.205  800.5  2174.6 0.368 
Aug-09  -5.4  -18.8 15.4  -2.5  -0.3 0.7 -18.8 36.2  -0.518  797.1  2210.8  0.361 
                                      
                     
  
Table 4. China's Holdings of U.S. Government Debt 
(in billions of U.S. dollars) 
                    
   March 30, 2000  June 30, 2007  August 30, 2009 
   Treasuries Agencies Treasuries Agencies Treasuries Agencies
                    
Total Outstanding Held by the Public  3,519  3,334  4,943  6,077   7,394  7,174 
Total Held by Foreigners  884  261  2,194  1,413   2,872  1,448 
China's Holdings   71  20  477  387   797  417 
     
China's Share of Foreign Holdings  8.0% 7.5% 21.8% 27.4%  27.7% 28.8%
China's Share of Total Outstanding  2.0% 0.6% 9.7% 6.4%  10.8% 5.8%
Foreign Share of Total Outstanding  25.1% 7.8% 44.4% 23.3%  38.8% 20.2%
                    
          
Note (1): For the purposes of this table, Treasury is defined as "debt held by public."  Including 
"Intragovernmental holdings" Total Treasury Debt on March 30, 2000 was $5.8 trillion and on August 30, 
2009 it was $11.7 trillion. 
Note (2): The TIC System contains data on holding by Chinese, and not by the Chinese government.  Some of 
the Treasury and Agency holdings reported in this table may not be held by the State Administration of 
Foreign Exchange. 
Sources: TIC System, Federal Reserve Flow of Funds, and Treasury's Bureau of Public Debt. 
 
 